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JURISDICTION
Original jurisdiction lies with the UtaJ^ Supreme Court, but the case has been
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Hernandez is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Baker, thus

precluding relief for Baker under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) for failure to show that he has a
"meritorious defense."
Standard of Review: Whether a defense is meritorious for purposes of a Rule
60(b)(1) motion is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Lund v. Brown,
11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000).
2.

a.

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter default judgment against

Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp. ("the Corporation").
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter judgment
against a party is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State Dept. of
Social Services v. Vijil, 784 P.2dl 130 (Utah 1989)
b.

Whether Hernandez is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against the

Corporation, thus precluding relief under U.R.C.P. 60(b) for failure to show a
"meritorious defense."
Standard of Review: Whether a defense is meritorious for purposes of a Rule
60(b) motion is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Lund v. Brown, 11
1
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P.3d 277 (Utah 2000).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

>

[Note: Rules 3, 15 and 60 are omitted, as they are set forth in pertinent part in the Brief
of Appellants]
Statutes
Utah Code
38-2-4. Disposal of property by lienholder — Procedure.
(1) Any party holding a lien upon personal property as provided in this chapter
may dispose of the property in the manner provided in Subsection (2).
(2) (a) The lienor shall give notice to the owner of the property, to the customer as
indicated on the work order, and to all other persons claiming an interest in or lien on it,
as disclosed by the records of the Motor Vehicle Division, lieutenant governor's office,
or of corresponding agencies of any other state in which the property appears registered
or an interest in or lien on it is evidenced if known by the lienor.
(b) The notice shall be sent by certified mail at least 30 days before the proposed
or scheduled date of any sale and shall contain:
(i) a description of the property and its location;
(ii) the name and address of the owner of the property, the customer as indicated
on the work order, and any person claiming an interest in or lien on the property;
(iii) the name, address, and telephone number of the lienor;
(iv) notice that the lienor claims a lien on the property for labor and services
performed and interest and storage fees charged, if any, and the cash sum which, if paid
to the lienor, would be sufficient to redeem the property from the lien claimed by the lienor;
(v) notice that the lien claimed by the lienor is subject to enforcement under this
section and that the property may be sold to satisfy the lien;
(vi) the date, time, and location of any proposed or scheduled sale of the property
and whether the sale is private or public, except that no property may be sold earlier than
45 days after completion of the repair work; and
(vii) notice that the owner of the property has a right to recover possession of the
property without instituting judicial proceedings by posting bond.
2
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(3) If the owner of the property is unknown or his whereabouts cannot be
determined, or if the owner or any person notified under Subsection (2) fails to
acknowledge receipt of the notice, the lienor, at least 20 days before the proposed or
scheduled date of sale of the property, shall publish the notice required by this section
once in a newspaper circulated in the county where the vehicle is held.
(4) A lienee may have his property released from any lien claimed on it under this
chapter by filing with the clerk of a justice court or district court a cash or surety bond,
payable to the person claiming the lien, and conditioned for the payment of any judgment
that may be recovered on the lien, with costs, interest, and storage fees.
(5) (a) The lienor has 60 days after receiving notice that the lienee has filed the
bond provided in Subsection (4) to file suit to foreclose his lien.
(b) If the lienor fails to timely file an action, the clerk of the court shall release the bond.
(6) Property subject to lien enforcement under this section may be sold by the
lienor at public or private sale; however, in the case of a private sale, every aspect of the
sale, including the method, manner, time, place, and terms shall be commercially reasonable.
(7) This section may not be construed to affect an owner's right to redeem his
property from the lien at any time prior to sale by paying the amount claimed by the
lienor for work done, interest, and storage fees charged and any costs incurred by the
repair shop for using enforcement procedures under this section.
(1996) (1995 version not available to counsel)
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section inapplicable to DUI cases —
Division of award with state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded
only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of Subsection
(l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor's
operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntarily intoxicated or under the
influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding shoplifting
is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general damages under Subsection
(l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid to the merchant prior to or as a part of
a civil action under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible only after a
finding of liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3) (a) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of the
amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after an allowable deduction
for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit
3
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into the General Fund.
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allowable deduction for the payment
of attorneys' fees and costs" shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs incurred by the judgment creditor, minus the amount of any separate
judgment awarding attorneys' fees and costs to the judgment creditor.
(2002)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case is an appeal from the trial court's "Order Denying Motion to Set Aside

Judgment and Motion to Enforce July 31, 2001 Order."
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition at the Trial Court
1.

Hernandez and his original attorney signed a Verified Complaint on

December 31, 1996, naming Baker, d.b.a. Performance Auto & Marine Supply, and Does
I through X as defendants, and stating claims for, first, violations of the Utah Consumer
Sales Practices Act, second, replevin, third, conversion and/or trespass to chattels, and
fourth, punitive damages in the amount of $25,000. The Verified Complaint was filed in
the Fourth District Court for Utah County on January 15, 1997. R. 1-9.
2.

Baker was personally served on January 22, 1997. R. 10-12.

3.

Venue of the action was changed from the Fourth District Court in Utah

County to the Third District Court in Salt Lake County upon Baker's motion. R. 13-18.
4.

Hernandez moved for entry of default judgment against Baker on

November 12, 1998, because no Answer had been filed. R. 23-28. Baker opposed the
motion, stating, inter alia, that he had never been served with a copy of the order
4
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changing venue to the Third District Court, nor had he been otherwise notified of the
actual entry of such an order or the new case number and judge in the Third District
Court, and that he had not been served with the Verified Complaint since its filing in the
Third District Court. R. 29-36.
5.

The District Court entered a minute entry decision on the motion for entry

of default judgment that Baker was to be served with the Verified Complaint again. R.
19-20.
6.

Baker was personally served a second time, on January 20, 2000, after

Baker was located at a new address. R. 54-55. Baker filed an unverified Answer
through counsel on February 11, 2000. PL. 56-61.
7.

Hernandez filed a motion for leave to amend complaint and to join

Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp. ("the Corporation") as a party defendant on
September 21, 2000. R. 71-72; R. 62-70. Hernandez's counsel submitted a "[Proposed]
Amended Complaint" with the motion to amend and mailed the same to Baker's counsel.
(See text of motion to amend, R. 71. However, the [Proposed] Amended Complaint does
not appear in the District Court record.
8.

The District Court granted leave to amend the complaint and join the

Corporation as requested. R. 78.
9.

Hernandez propounded interrogatories and requests for production of

documents on Baker and the Corporation in May of 2001. R. 82. At the same time,
counsel for Hernandez wrote to counsel for Baker and the Corporation inquiring as to
5
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why no answer had been made to the amended complaint. R. 105.
10.

The trial court issued an order to show cause sua sponte in June of 2001 as

trial courts typically do as an ordinary docket management measure. R. 84.
11.

Hernandez filed a motion to compel discovery responses in November

2001. R. 89-108. Neither Baker nor the Corporation responded to the motion.
12.

The trial court issued an order compelling responses to discovery and

warning that sanctions will be entered for failure to respond. R. 111-114.
13.

Having received no response, and having no notice of the

defendants/appellants counsel at the time having changed his address, Hernandez filed a
Motion for Entry of Default and Default Judgment on July 22, 2002. R. 115-133.
Hernandez requested a hearing pursuant to Ut. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) and Code of Judicial
Administration Rule 4-501 (3)(B) in effect at the time. R. 116.
14.

The District Court entered default against Baker and the Corporation on

August 23, 2002. R. 138. An evidentiary hearing was scheduled for September 27,
2002. R. 139.
15.

After hearing testimony from Hernandez, and proffers and argument from

his counsel, the judge decided to award Hernandez judgment as prayed. R. 141.
Hernandez's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees and presented the court with
detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and submitted a written judgment for
signature and entry. R. 142-164.
16.

Judgment was entered against Baker and the Corporation jointly and
6
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severally on February 14, 2003, as follows:
a.

$12,500.00 as compensatory damages for the conversion of

Hernandez's boat and trailer;
b.

Interest at the statutory prejudgment rate of 10% per annum on the

principal sum of $12,500.00 from the time of conversion until entry of the
judgment, a period of approximately six years, for total pre-judgment interest of
$7,500.00;
c.

Punitive damages of $25,000.00 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-

d.

Hernandez's reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $7,539.75 in

18-1;

accordance with counsel's affidavit submitted pursuant to Rule 4-505, C.J.A.; and
e.

Hernandez's court costs of $80.00 for the filing fee and $58.00 for

service of process.
f.

The total of all sums awarded is $52,677.75.

R. 165-166.
17.

Hernandez had an abstract of judgment filed in the Fifth District Court in

Washington County, and had a writ of execution issued against Baker's house. See R.
208 at K 32; R. 375-377.
18.

Baker and the Corporation filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment

and a "Motion to Enforce July 31, 2001, Order" on May 1, 2003, accompanied by
affidavits and a memorandum. R. 172-191. Hernandez filed an opposing memorandum
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with exhibits and an affidavit. R. 201-237. Baker filed a Second Affidavit and he and
the Corporation filed a reply memorandum with exhibits. R. 280-316.
19.

The trial court issued a minute entry denying the defendants' motions on

July 7, 2003. R. 328-330. A written Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Judgment and
Motion to Enforce July, 2001 Order, along with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, were signed by Judge Henriod on August 12, 2003, and entered of record on
August 13, 2003. R. 333-338.
20.

Baker and the Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on

September 8, 2003. R. 339-340.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Facts Supporting or Relating to Order Denying Motions
21.

The trial court found that the defendants the defendants "failed to provide

'specific' and 'detailed' facts necessary to support their underlying claim and therefore are
unable to set forth the necessary evidence of a meritorious defense to the action against
them." R 329; see also R. 337.
22.

At p. 8, second paragraph of the Brief of Appellants Baker and the

Corporation state that "trial counsel for both parties argued extensively in their written
memoranda concerning (1) Baker's individual liability under a corporate shield defense
and (2) whether the sale of the boat complied with the repairman's lien statutes." In
addition, Hernandez argued below that Baker has personal liability as an intentional
8
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tortfeasor above and beyond any liability under an alter ego or "piercing the corporate
veil" theory. Passim.
23.

Hernandez will call the Court's attention to the facts set forth in the

Argument section of this brief, infra, wherein it is shown that judgment as a matter of
law can be upheld against Baker in his personal capacity based on the undisputed or
indisputable facts and the conclusions of law clearly drawn therefrom.
Substantive Facts of the Case as Found by the Trial Court
24.

All of the trial court's findings in support of the Judgment are relevant to

this appeal, and in the interest of economy Hernandez refers the Court to the trial court's
Findings of Fact, found at R. 154-160, supporting the Judgment.
25.

The statement of facts Hernandez presented to the trial court in his

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Set Aside And Motion to Enforce
was before the trial court when it decided in favor of Hernandez in ruling on the
appellants' motion to set aside, and again in the interest of economy, Hernandez refers the
Court to the trial court record at R. 201-208 and R. 220-237.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The order of the trial court denying Baker's motion to set aside should be affirmed
because Baker is personally liable for conversion of Hernandez's boat as a matter of law,
based on undisputed material facts and the legal conclusions which properly follow
therefrom.
9
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The order of the trial court denying the Corporation's motion to set aside can be
affirmed because the process and notice provided, while not perfect, actually and
substantively gave notice of the claims against the Corporation and afforded an
opportunity to be heard, and likely provided a superior level of actual notice than strict
adherence to the prescribed form of notice would have.
The award of punitive damages is supported by the undisputed facts, is consistent
with U.C.A. § 78-18-1, and was within the discretion of the trial court to make.

ARGUMENT
I.

BAKER'S DEFENSE IS UNMERITORIOUS
Even under the holdings of Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders, 882 P.2d

1147 (Utah 1994) and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000), Baker lacks a
meritorious defense which would entitle him to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). In Erickson
v. Schenkers, the Utah Supreme Court forged a unified holding out of the thin plurality
holding of State by & through D. ofSS v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983).
Indeed, the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Erickson v. Schenkers was authored
by Justice Durham, who wrote the dissenting opinion of Musselman concurred in by
Justice Stewart. The Supreme Court further demonstrated its solidarity on the
meritorious defense rule in its unanimous opinion in Lundv. Brown authored by Justice
Durrant. The essence of the Supreme Court's holdings in Erickson v. Schenkers and
Lund v. Brown is that a defendant satisfies the meritorious defense prong of a Rule
10
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60(b)(1) motion if he presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, as a matter of
law, is entitled to be tried. 882 P.2d at 1149; 11 P.3d at 283. By corollary, if material
facts are disputed which preclude judgment as a matter of law against a defendant, the
meritorious defense prong is satisfied. Conversely, if the undisputed (or indisputable)
material facts support judgment against a defendant as a matler of law, then the defense
is not meritorious for purposes of deciding a motion under Rule 60(b)(1).
In the instant case, the following material facts, which support judgment against
Baker personally as a matter of law, are undisputed or indisputable:
a.

Baker was an employee and/or officer and/or agent of

Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp. (the Corporation) during the
relevant time periods of this case while the Corporation was in existence.
(R. 193 at 14, R. 194 at f 14; R. 281 at ^ 5 & 6.)
b.

Some time in 1995, Baker was involved (at least as an

employee, officer or agent of the Corporation, which Hernandez will accept
for these purposes) in the sale or other transfer of Hernandez's boat, or in
delivering it, to a third party, without strict compliance with the
requirements of U.C.A. § 38-2-4. (The Appellants' claim to have complied
with U.C.A. § 38-2-4 applies to an alleged second sale of Hernandez's boat,
but Appellants have never alleged that the first sale or transfer of
Hernandez's boat in 1995 was in compliance with § 38-2-4. Furthermore,
Baker's denials in his answer to having dealt with Hernandez or his boat are
11
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premised on his defense strategy that only the Corporation, and not Baker
in his personal capacity, had any involvement with Hernandez or his boat.)
(See Baker's Answer, R. 57 at <[ffi 6 through 14, 16, and 32 through 35, a
copy of which is included as Exhibit C to the Brief of Appellants; see R.
292 at f 26, R. 283-4 atffij25-26 & 28; note R. 281 atffl[5 & 6 and R. 289
at 114.)
c.

Daniel Gibbons, acting as attorney for "Performance Auto &

Marine Supply," wrote a letter to Hernandez dated November 10, 1995,
after the sale of Hernandez's boat, which notably fails to allege compliance
with (or even to mention) the lien foreclosure law in general or U.C.A. 382-4 in particular. (R. 225-226; R. 292 at 128; R. 307.) The letter states,
"Pursuant to your agreement with my client, Performance Auto & Marine
has successfully sold your boat to a third party buyer."
d.

There was no express agreement between the parties for the

sale of Hernandez's boat. The only agreement the Appellants allege existed
between the parties for the sale of Hernandez's boat was one arising from
the fact that Baker claims it was the "normal business practice" of
Performance Auto & Marine Supply (which Baker claims was "evidenced
by a sign posted on the wall") that any vehicle or boat left at the
Performance Auto & Marine Supply shop "after 30 days of the repairs
being completed would be considered abandoned and sold." (R. 283 at ^
12
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21, a copy of which is found in Exhibit D to the Brief of Appellants; R.
291 atf 19.)
The following legal conclusions clearly and properly follow from the foregoing
undisputed material facts:
1.

The first sale of Hernandez's boat, in 1995, violated U.C.A. § 38-2-4.

2.

Conversion of Hernandez's boat occurred at the first sale.

3.

As a matter of law, Baker is personally liable for the conversion, without

resort to any "alter ego" or "piercing the corporate veil" theories, by virtue of the
undisputed fact of his involvement in the material, dispositive facts of the case (even if
only and at all times in his capacity as an employee and/or officer and/or agent of the
Corporation. In support of this legal conclusion, Hernandez cites the following
authorities:
Restatement of the Law, Second, of Torts
§ 233. Conversion by Disposition by Agent as Against One Other Than
Principal
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (4), one who as agent or servant of a third
person disposes of a chattel to one not entitled to its immediate possession in
consummation of a transaction negotiated by the agent or servant, is subject to
liability for a conversion to another who, as against his principal or master, is
entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel.
(2) An agent or servant who negotiates a transaction for the purpose of
13 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

transferring a proprietary interest in a chattel is not liable for a conversion to
another who is entitled to its immediate possession, if the actor does not deliver
the chattel pursuant to such transaction, and if the agent or servant neither knows
nor has reason to know that his principal or master does not have authority so to
dispose of it.
(3) An agent or servant who merely delivers a chattel in consummation of a
transaction negotiated by his principal or master is not liable for a conversion to
another who is entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel, if the agent or
servant neither knows nor has reason to know that his principal or master is not
authorized so to dispose of it.
(4) The statement in Subsection (1) is not applicable to an agent or servant who
disposes of current money, or a document negotiable by common law or by
statute, pursuant to a transaction by which the transferee becomes a holder in due
course of such money or document, unless the agent or servant knows of has
reason to know that his principal or master does not have authority so to dispose
of it.
§ 234. Conversion as Against Bailor by Misdelivery
A bailee, agent, or servant who makes an unauthorized delivery of a chattel is
subject to liability for conversion to his bailor, principal, or master unless he
delivers to one who is entitled to immediate possession of the chattel.
The Restatement, 2d, position is that Baker is personally liable to both Hernandez and the
14
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Corporation for his involvement in the conversion by disposition (here, a sale), or
conversion by misdelivery (it is clear at least that Hernandez's boat was delivered to
someone other than Hernandez, not entitled to its immediate possession because Utah
Code Ann. § 38-2-4 was not complied with). There is no contrary Utah statutory or case
law authority which contradicts the Restatement position, that Hernandez is aware of.
Utah law clearly recognizes conversion as a cause of action1, and the Restatement, 2d,
position would serve as a natural and well-reasoned further defining of Utah's conversion
law.
Common Law of Torts
It is irrelevant to the question of Baker's personal^ whether he acted at all times in
his capacity as an employee, officer or agent of the Corporation. It is axiomatic that
Baker is personally liable for intentional torts, and due to his involvement in the
operative facts of the case he is personally liable for the conversion of Hernandez's boat.
It is a well-established principle of law that when an officer of a corporation commits an
intentional tort he is personally liable directly, without the need to disregard the corporate
entity in order to reach him. Baker's actions in appropriating Hernandez's boat and
selling it without any authority amount to the kind of intentional tort for which a
corporate officer or shareholder will be liable personally for his own actions. Baker is a

1

See, e.g., Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993)
(upholding judgment for conversion of a vehicle, with awards of compensatory damages
of $16,300 and punitive damages of $25,000) and Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854
P.2d 527 (Utah 1993).
15
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proper party defendant in the case before the Court and the judgment rendered against
him is valid. Baker's "corporate shield defense" is unmeritorious as a matter of law.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD LOOK OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS
The narrow interpretation of the meritorious defense rule argued by Baker in the

Brief of Appellants would only look at the pleadings - the complaint and an answer or
proposed answer (even if unverified) - and not other undisputed evidence (such as, in the
case subjudice, the November 10, 1995 letter found at R. 225-6). This is inconsistent
with established Utah jurisprudence where in motions to dismiss or motions for summary
judgment, the court will look outside the pleadings if there are indeed additional sources
or examples of undisputed evidence before the trial court. Doit, Inc. v. Touche, Ross &
Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996); Utah R. Civ. P. 56 2. Just as a motion to dismiss will be
treated as a motion for summary judgment if there is additional evidence in the file that
can show what the undisputed facts are, so should a court look outside the pleadings to
sources of undisputed facts in the file and presented to the trial court for consideration as
it decides a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside. Id. See also, Eastmondv. Earl, 912 P.2d 994
(UtahApp. 1996).
In the instant case the trial court had a very critical, material piece of evidence

2

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) states: "The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages."
16
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before it which establishes the core operative fact of the case: the letter dated November
19, 1995 from the Appellants' first trial court attorney, Daniel Gibbons, which admits
that "Performance Auto & Marine" sold Hernandez's boat, but makes no mention of the
workman's lien foreclosure laws, but instead claims the boat was sold pursuant to mutual
agreement. (R. 225-226; R. 292 at ^f 28; R. 307.) This is manifestly inconsistent with a
lien foreclosure sale made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-4. The Court must also
note that Baker and the Corporation knew very well at around the time of the November
10, 1995, letter from Mr. Gibbons that Hernandez disputed the claim to a sale by mutual
agreement, and a workman's lien was clearly implicated from the circumstances, yet
Baker and/or Performance did not make any claim of having sold Hernandez's boat
through a legitimate lien foreclosure sale pursuant to § 38-2-4 until more than a year
later, after a purported second sale of a boat which had already been sold, according to
Baker's (and the Corporation's) repeated statements.
The narrow, cribbed interpretation of the 60(b) meritorious defense rule urged by
the Appellants, which would look only at the pleadings - in the instant case, a Verified
Complaint and a notably unverified Answer - hobbles the genetic rationale for Justice
Durham's dissent in Musselman and the unanimous Erickson and Lund decisions which
sprang from it. The Musselman dissent and the Erickson and Lund opinions rejected the
idea that a defendant who has demonstrated an acceptable excuse for the entry of default
should **et be required to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence - a trial
standard without the opportunity and process a trial gives for a party to so prove his case.
17
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(See, for example, Lund, 11 P.3d at 283, f 29.) All three opinions express the common
theme articulated in Lund as follows:
"Moreover, we have clearly articulated the fundamental policy underlying
the meritorious defense rule. That policy is simply to prevent the necessity
of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face. Thus, where a party
presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would
preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant or counterclaimant, it has
adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense for the purposes
of its motion to set aside a default judgment."
11 P.3d at 283, ^f 29. There is nothing in this rule of decision and the considerations
which underpin it that militates against looking beyond the pleadings to other
undisputable evidence before the trial court as it determines whether the defendants have
"a defense entitled to be tried." Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149, quoting the dissent of
Musselman at 1059. There are well-established standards in the analogous situations of
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment where the legal standards are in
every other respect the same as the 60(b) meritorious defense standard, and judgment can
only be rendered against a party if the material facts are undisputed, construing all
ambiguity in favor of the party against whom judgment is sought, such that judgment can
be rendered as a matter of law. A defense which lacks sufficient legal merit to prevent
judgment as a matter of law is an unmeritorious defense, whether it be a motion to
dismiss, a motion for summary judgment or a motion to set aside. "Judgment as a matter
18
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of law" should not mean different things and require different standards in clearly
analogous circumstances where the interests are the same. A defendant who loses a
motion for summary judgment has no more or less meritorious a defense than a
defendant who is unable to show a meritorious defense in a 60(b) motion - neither
defense is "entitled to be tried."
The language the Supreme Court chose in Lund v. Brown deserves careful
attention. It says that a defendant must "present[] a clear and specific proffer of a
defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant." 11 P.2d
at 283 (emphasis added). In the instant case, neither Baker nor t he Corporation have
presented a clear and specific proffer of a defense against Hernandez's allegations and
claims, as is shown supra in this brief. They have not even proffered any specific
defense to their own letter dated November 10, 1995, which on its face shows that the
sale of Hernandez's boat was not in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-4. And any
claim that the sale was made pursuant to an agreement clearly lacks merit as well, as is
shown from the Appellants inability to show a legally and factually meritorious argument
that it was.
The jurisprudential tunnel vision which the Appellants favor would do nothing
less than give license to obfuscating technicalities and gamesmanship at the expense of
justice, equity, the search for truth, and the rule of law. It would lead, even more than is
true of present practice, to Answers consisting of denials, general and otherwise, which
would push pleading practice into ethically shady areas where good will becomes lost in
19
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the murk. That is the wrong direction to take the law.
III.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE JUSTIFIED AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Appellants' conduct in selling Hernandez's boat and trailer was willful and

malicious and evinces a reckless disregard for Hernandez's rights. Utah Code Ann., §
78-18-l(l)(a) provides, "[ejxcept as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages
may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor
are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of
others."
State Law
Utah case law on punitive damages is set forth in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch,
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) (Crookston I) and Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937
(Utah 1993) (Crookston II). The Utah Supreme Court in Crookston I articulated the
following seven factors to evaluate a claim for punitive damages:
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct;
(iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof
on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of
the misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual
damages awarded.
Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 808.
The Crookston factors were further upheld in the seminal case of Campbell v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, the largest punitive damages case in Utah history. In
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Campbell v. State Farm, the Utah Supreme Court, after conducting a thorough
Crookston analysis, reinstated a $145 million punitive damages award which had been
reduced by the trial court to $25 million. In addition, the court in Campbell considered
the recent United States Supreme Court cases of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), and BMW v. Gore of North America, Inc., 517
U.S. 559 (1996), and found the $145 million punitive damages award (representing a
145:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages) to be consistent with the holdings in
those cases.
The application of the facts of this case to the Crookston factors clearly supports
Hernandez's $25,000 punitive damages judgment:
1. The relative wealth of the defendant. The Appellants' failure to respond to
Hernandez's discovery has impeded Hernandez in trying to gain evidence of defendant's
wealth. However, given the modesty of Hernandez's request for punitive damages in
relation to his actual damages, this first factor in the Crookston analysis is less important
than the others. See Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App.
1993) (upholding judgment for conversion of a vehicle, with awards of compensatory
damages of $16,300 and punitive damages of $25,000) - almost the precise conduct and
precise ratio as the instant case involves.
2. The nature of the alleged misconduct. The Utah Supreme Court in Campbell stated
that "[t]his factor specifically analyzes the nature of the defendant's conduct in terms of
its maliciousness, reprehensibility, and wrongfulness. It mirrors the 'reprehensibility'
21
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factor described by the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)." In the instant case, the Appellants' misconduct is egregious.
The Appellants essentially stole Hernandez's boat after he entrusted it to them, and then
lied about it. Simply requiring the Appellants to repay their ill-gotten gain would neither
do justice nor provide a sufficient disincentive for future conduct. Otherwise, the
Appellants might find their conduct to be a convenient means of acquiring property
without the trouble of having the previous owner actually consent to the change in
ownership.
3. The facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct. The Utah Supreme Court in
Campbell explained that "this factor looks to the circumstances surrounding the illegal
conduct, particularly with respect to what the defendant knew and what was motivating
his or her actions. See Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984)."
(Citation in original). The Appellants' conduct was intentional and demonstrated a
reckless disregard for Hernandez's rights. Appellants' conduct was precisely of the kind
contemplated for an award of punitive damages under U.C.A. § 78-18-1.
4. The effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others. Here, the effect of
Appellants' conduct on Hernandez was straightforward - Hernandez was deprived of the
value, use and enjoyment of his family recreational boat.
5. The probability of future recurrence of the misconduct. While Hernandez has no
evidence of a past pattern of like conduct by the Appellants, the clear and easy gain the
Appellants enjoyed from unlawfully taking Hernandez's boat must be punished to
22
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dissuade Appellants from future conduct. Similar opportunities for illicit gain could
present themselves to Appellants in the future.
6. The relationship of the parties. In this case, the Appellants occupied a special position
of trust in relation to Hernandez. Appellants provided consumer boat repair services, and
were bailees to Hernandez. This relationship is one of the most important factors
justifying punitive damages. Hernandez entrusted his boat to the Appellants, and the
Appellants abused that trust with malicious disregard for Hernandez's rights.
7. The amount of actual damages awarded. The amount of Hernandez's actual damages
is approximately $12,500. The $25,000 in punitive damages is double the actual
damages, and is clearly not excessive in relation to actual damages. In fact, the requested
punitive damages are conservative, especially in light of Appellants' conduct. See Lake
Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951.
Federal Law
In addition to the Crookston factors which set forth state law, the court must look
at the BMW factors which reflect federal constitutional law. In the BA4W case three
"guideposts" were identified: "[1] the degree of reprehensibility of the [conduct]; [2] the
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered . . . and [the] punitive damages
award; and [3] the difference between this remedy [the punitive damage award] and the .
. . penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Campbell v. State Farm, citing
BMW at 574-575. As the Campbell court noted, the reprehensibility guidepost of the
BMW is essentially the same as the second and third Crookston factors, so further
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analysis is unnecessary. With regard to the second guidepost, the punitive damages
claimed by Hernandez in the instant case fall well within constitutional limits. Looking
at the third guidepost, "the difference between [the punitive damage award] and the . . .
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases," punitive damages are clearly
justified. What the Appellants did is commit theft, and based on the dollar value of
Hernandez's boat, it falls in the range for a second degree felony. See U.C.A. § 76-6412. In addition, U.C.A. § 76-6-412(2) authorizes an action for treble damages.
Hernandez's judgment basically equates to treble damages, and is clearly not excessive in
light of the criminal and civil penalties provided in § 76-6-412.
Both Utah and federal law clearly support Hernandez's judgment for punitive
damages. The award of punitive damages are based on reason or justice, and not
passion or prejudice. Lake Philgas, 845 P.2d at 959.
IV,

THE CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER RULE
60(b)
The judgment against the Corporation should stand because the Corporation was

properly joined as a party, it had actual notice of the proceedings, and failed to take
action to prevent a default judgment against it. The essence of the notice contemplated
by Rule 4, U.R.C.P., is actual notice. The Corporation clearly had actual notice of being
joined as a party. In fact, little would have been accomplished by attempting to go
through the motions of serving a summons on the Corporation since Baker, the registered
agent, could not be found at the registered office of the corporation. By the time Baker
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was served with a summons for the second time in this litigation, months before the
Corporation was joined as a party, Performance was no longer doing business at the
address listed for the corporation's registered agent and Baker could not be found there.
The fact that the original Complaint named Performance Auto & Marine Supply
as a d.b.a. of Baker is a non-prejudicial misnomer. See Wilcox v Geneva Rock Corp.,
911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996). There can be no doubt that Baker, both in his "individual
capacity" and his "representative capacity" for the Corporation, knew that the claims of
the Complaint were equally directed against the Corporation as they were against him
personally. Baker, as the President, director, and registered agent of the Corporation,
clearly had notice from the beginning of this matter, even prior to litigation, that the
Corporation was implicated in liability. Indeed, Baker's sole defense "in his personal
capacity" can fairly be characterized as materially and operatively relying on the
Corporation having liability. Baker calls it his "corporate shield defense."
The Corporation relies on the defense of lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the
failure of the Amended Complaint and a Summons to have been served on Baker while
wearing his hat as corporate representative, instead of Baker without the hat. This view
ignores the substantive law infusing the jurisdictional ontology - that of actual notice and
nexus which comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
(Citing International Shoe Co., v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
The Utah Court of Appeals case of Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App.
1999) strongly supports the relation back doctrine by cementing the identify of interest
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test by holding that where real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the
proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially from an early stage (both of which are
true of the Corporation in the instant case), liberal amendment and relation back precepts
should be applied. In the instant case, any amendment of the complaint to include the
Corporation, which will be based on all of the identical material facts as the original
complaint, relates back to the filing date of the original complaint. There is no bar of
claims against the Corporation from the operation of a statute of limitations.
Furthermore, the claims against the Corporation would not be barred by untimely
service, according to the rule of Valley Asphalt, Inc., v. Eldon J. Stubbs Construction,
Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986), a suit for foreclosure of mechanic's lien, which held
that if a summons is issued and served timely against one defendant, other defendants,
whether named in original complaint or brought in by amendment, may be served
anytime before trial. This holding merely affirms the clear language of Utah R. Civ. P.
4(b). See also Ringwoodv. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990)
(finding relation back even if statute has run, and that actual notice in case of new claims
was sufficient provided they were founded on the same basic transaction and facts; the
corporate veil was pierced.)
It should be understood that default was not entered against the Corporation for
failure to answer the call of a summons, but rather the call of discovery. The Corporation
had been duly joined as a party, but did not respond in any way to discovery requests or a
motion and order to compel issued to it. Presumably that failure was excused by the trial
26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court, because the first prong was of the Rule 60(b) test was ignored. That should also
mean that the trial court found the Corporations jurisdictional arguments without merit.
Hernandez will now distinguish the authorities cited by the Corporation in its brief
from the instant case. State Dept of Social Services v. Vijil, 784 P.2dl 130 (Utah 1989)
is distinguishable because it deals with subject-matter jurisdiction of a Navajo aboriginal
American living within the boundaries of the Navajo Tribal Reservation. Personal
jurisdiction was not addressed, and the case does not deal with substantively correct, but
formally incorrect, notice.
Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) is distinguishable because the
defendant did not receive actual notice. Here, Baker, agent for Performance, received
actual notice.
Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225 (Utah 2001) is inapposite, as it deals with
failure to file an original filing fee.
Donner v. Sulcus Computer Corp., 103 F.R.D. 548 (1984) is distinguishable
because rules of civil procedure required the plaintiff to obtain leave of court to amend
its complaint, and the plaintiff failed to obtain such leave. In the instant case, the
Appellee obtained leave of court as required by Rule 15, Utah R. Civ. P.
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 120 S.Ct 1579, 146 L.Ed.2d 530
(2000) is also distinguishable because in that case a defendant was joined after judgment
was rendered and he did not have any meaningful opportunity to be heard, in violation of
his due process rights. The procedural history of the Nelson case is substantially
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different than that of the instant case. Rule 59(e) was invoked, after judgment was
rendered, to add a party. But in the instant case, a proper motion under Rule 15 was filed
to join Performance, the amended complaint was provided (but mysteriously not filed) as
an exhibit to the motion, the court ordered that Performance be joined, and all of this was
served by mail on counsel for Kelly Baker, with Baker being the registered agent for
Performance. Hernandez's counsel followed up with Baker's counsel by letter inquiring
why the Amended Complaint had not been answered. R. 105. Unlike Nelson,
Performance had actual notice before judgment was entered and ample opportunity to
compose a response and be heard in court.
If notice would have been served on the Utah Department of Commerce, Division
of Corporations and Commercial Code because neither Baker nor the corporation could
be located at their registered address, it hardly would have been likely to provide actual
notice to the corporation, or to Baker as agent for the corporation. The irony is that
formally serving the Division of Corporations would have constituted the observance of
form at the expense of substantive notice, while the informal service on Baker's attorney
provided actual, substantive notice, though lacking in strict adherence to prescribed form.
The Corporation's jurisdictional defense lacks sufficient substance to require reversal of
the trial court's order denying the motion to set aside.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order denying Appellants' motion to set aside should be affirmed
and the case remanded for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent
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with the Court of Appeals' opinion in the instant case.
DATED this 9 it** day of April, 2004.

C^n
Thomas P. Isom (6895)
Attorney for Appellee
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